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                           Abstract 
  In this thesis, we will analyze the effect of venture capitalists (VC) on patent 
applications, focusing on their effects on patent applications in the pre-and  post-IPO 
periods for Japanese firms. It can be stated that the shareholding by VC is  positively 
correlated with their patent applications in the pre-IPO period; however, this  effect 
becomes feeble in the post-IPO period. On the basis of the analysis, it was found  that 
VC promoted the patent application of Japanese firms in the pre-IPO  period, in order 
to enhance their market values. 
                           
   2 
1.  Introduction   
 
There has been a boom in the number of initial public offerings (IPO) by venture 
firms in the Japanese stock markets in recent years. Many of these firms have performed 
an IPO at JASDAQ and the Tokyo Stock Exchange that were newly established in Japan. 
From 1999 to 2001, 488 firms issued a number of IPOs in the JASDAQ and Tokyo 
Stock Exchange that were new at that time. In order to gain profits, venture capitalists 
(VC) funded many of these firms. Many of these firms were high-tech firms, resulting 
in rapid technical progress in the Japanese economy. 
The relationship between VC and innovation has previously been investigated in a 
few studies. Kortum and Lerner (2000) argue that the firms invested by VC have an 
incentive to perform R&D activities. Sahlman (1990) proves that VC have the power 
and ability to promote the innovative activities of portfolio firms by using their 
specialized experience and expertise. In addition, Hellmann and Puri (2000) support this 
view and show that VC positively participate in the innovative strategy of high-tech 
firms.     3 
Despite the increasing focus on the VC’s contribution to innovation, there are few 
previous studies that have focused on the effect of VC on the patent application of 
Japanese firms in the pre- and post-IPO periods.   
In this paper, we will analyze the effect of shareholding by VC on the patent 
applications of Japanese firms, focusing particularly on the change in the role of VC in 
the pre-  and post-IPO periods.  We will conclude whether shareholding by VC  is 
supposed to have a positive effect on the patent applications of firms brought by R&D 
expenditures. 
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the effects 
of VC on patent applications in the pre- and post-IPO periods of Japanese firms. Section 
3 explains the estimation model. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 describes the 
empirical results and their implications. Finally, section 6 concludes the thesis, 
presenting certain limitations of this study and discussing the scope for further research.   
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
   4 
Innovation and Information Asymmetry, Firm value 
The role of innovation is often thought as an element that can create and maintain a 
firm’s value and is a recognized as the foundation upon which a firm develops. An R&D 
investment of firms will encourage the development of innovative products and services 
and lead to increased performance of the firms. A positive correlation between 
innovation and a firm’s value has been established in previous studies (Griliches, 1981; 
Pakes, 1985).   
The information about the firm is disclosed so as to inform investors about the 
firm’s value at the time of the IPO. Correct information about the quality of innovation 
of a firm at the time of the IPO can exhibit important information about its attainment in 
the IPO market. Therefore, if credible information on the value of a firm is provided at 
the time of the IPO, information asymmetry and the underpricing of the firms will be 
reduced (Rock, 1986). At the time of the IPO, information asymmetry as to the firm’s 
value will decrease with the disclosure of accurate information about the value of the 
firm’s innovation stock. This decrease in information asymmetry will be associated with 
an identical decrease in the  underpricing  of  market valuations.  Patent applications   5 
provide a lot of information about innovation undertaken by a firm. 
 
Patent Applications and a Firm’s Market Valuations 
Innovation is considered to be one of the significant elements of competition 
among firms. Lerner (1994) argued the relationship between the stock of intellectual 
property and the market valuation of firms, and observes that the patent holder on a 
single product can effectively protect intellectual property and set a monopoly price. 
Austin (1993) shows that the extent of patent applications may effect the future 
structure of a market; new patent applications can increase a firm’s market valuations.   
If a firm has many patents, it implies that the firm has the ability to undertake 
future innovations and to capitalize on its scientific developments that may be linked to 
its profit (Kogut and Zander, 1996).   
Because patents contain direct information about the value of the innovation and 
reflect the principal value creation ability of the firm, patent applications will diminish 
underpricing and  increase  the IPO firm’s market valuations. Consequently, patent 
application has an economically and statistically significant impact on the valuation of   6 
such firms.   
 
VC and Patents Applications 
There are a few previous studies on the relationship between VC and the patent 
applications of firms. For example, Sahlman (1990) argues that VC have the incentives 
to promote the innovative activities of portfolio firms by using their power and ability 
on their specialized experience and expertise of innovation. Kortum and Lerner (2000) 
acknowledge the influence of VC on patent applications of American firms. They argue 
that VC-backed firms are more likely to possess highly valuable and innovative ideas 
and  would  actively  apply for patent applications. Further, they observe that 
human-capital intensive, high-tech VC-backed venture firms generate higher levels of 
patent  applications output. Therefore, VC  funding is positively associated with a 
substantial increase in patenting.   
VC can demand large capital gains from the IPO of the firms that are invested by 
their. Therefore, in order to establish an early and successful IPO, they can increase the 
valuation of a firm by stimulating and promoting the patent applications of the firm.   7 
Moreover, VC have experience in managing innovative firms and also a considerable 
amount  of  expert knowledge in some technological fields and patent applications. 
Therefore, they may support the R&D activities of the firms and increase the patent 
applications of those firms by using their specialized experience and expertise.   
Despite the increasing focus on IPOs and VC, only a few studies have focused on 
(1) the patent application of Japanese  firms and (2) the change in the impact of 
shareholding by VC on patent applications in the pre- and post-IPO periods. In addition, 
we find that there is an inadequate analysis on the relationship among VC, syndicated 
VC, and the patent applications of Japanese firms in the pre- and post-IPO periods in 
previous studies. This paper addresses this issue.   
On the basis of the above discussion, we propose the following two hypotheses.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Shareholding by VC is supposed to have a positive effect on the patent 
applications of firms in the pre-IPO period. 
Hypothesis 2:  The positive influence of VC on the patent applications  of firms 
decreases in the post-IPO period.   8 
3. Estimation Strategy   
 
We analyzed the above-mentioned hypotheses on the basis of the following model.     
 
Model:   
PAT = f (Ownership Structure, Other Firm-level Factors, Industry Factors).   
 
In this model, the dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the number of 
patent applications plus one (PAT) and the natural logarithm of the number of patent 
applications plus contraptions plus one (PAT1). The explanatory variables comprise of 
the factors of VC and the factors of ownership structure as well as other firm-level and 
industry factors.   
The definitions of the dependent variables and the explanatory variables are shown 
in Table-1.   
In the above-mentioned model, the factors of ownership structure include 
shareholding by all VC (VCSH), shareholding ratio by syndicated venture capitalists   9 
(SVCSH), shareholding by bank-venture capitalist dummy (BA_VC), shareholding by 
bill-venture capitalist dummy (BI_VC), shareholding by firm-venture capitalist dummy 
(COM_VC), shareholding by independence-venture capitalist dummy (IND_VC) and 
shareholding by  foreign-venture capitalist dummy (FOR_VC). The other factors of 
ownership structure include shareholding ratio by lead shareholder, shareholding ratio 
by top-10 shareholder, shareholding ratio by banks, shareholding ratio by bills, 
shareholding ratio by firms, shareholding ratio by foreign firms and shareholding ratio 
by directors. Other firm-level factors include the firm’s size (the number of employees) 
and the natural logarithm of R&D expenditures.   
In Engel and Keilbach (2005), it is argued that VC invest in firms with a higher 
innovative output and a highly qualified management, thereby proving that venture 
capital firms do not promote innovation, but select innovative firms.   
If VC select innovative firms to invest, the shareholding ratio by VC is endogenous, 
resulting in the problems of simultaneity and reverse causality. In order to avoid these 
problems, the Tobit Model with endogenous regressors (IVTOBIT Model) is employed 
in the empirical analysis. The instrumental variables are considered as the dummy for   10 
the TOP shareholders that shareholding ratio is more than 1/3(TOPD) and the ratio of 1 
to the distance of the firms to Tokyo (DIS).   
Further, industry factors are expressed in terms of the industry dummy variables 
for manufacturing, software development, information-communication, wholesale-retail 
and other industries. In order to determine the relationship between VC and patent 
applications, we consider other firm-level factors (natural logarithm of R&D 
expenditures, firm size) and the industry factors as control variables.   
In the analysis, it can be expected that all these variables (VCSH and SVCSH) will 
have a positive effect on patent applications in the pre-IPO period. These variables are 
estimated interchangeably. If the coefficients of these  variables are proved to be 
positively and statistically significant, Hypothesis 1 is considered to be supported.   
Moreover, TOP_SH refers to the shareholding ratio in terms of lead share and 
TOP10_SH refers to shareholding ratio in terms of TOP10 share. If a chief shareholder 
is positively related with innovation, the coefficients of these variables are proved to be 
positively and statistically significant. 
The following firm-level variables are used in the estimation model. RDE is the   11 
natural logarithm for  R&D expenditures. According to the hypothesis proposed by 
Hausman et al. (1984), the number of patent applications increases with an increase in 
R&D expenditures. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that firms with high R&D 
expenditures will have more patents. Therefore, in this paper, we control the 
explanatory variables for the R&D expenditures. If the coefficients of RDE are proved 
to be positively and statistically significant, it shows that firms with high R&D 
expenditures are supposed to be more innovative and have more patent applications.   
The number of employees (SIZE) is an explanatory variable and is used as a proxy 
for a firm’s size. According to the Schumpeterian hypothesis, large firms have more 
internal funds, more opportunities to procure external funds, a high ability to take risks 
and more complementary resources for implementing innovation; large firms have high 
R&D expenditures. Therefore, we have to control for the effect of the firm’s size.   
As mentioned before, industry factors are represented by industry dummy variables. 
In our data, patent applications  are higher  in  the  manufacturing  and software 
development industries than in the  information-communication  and wholesale-retail 
industries. Therefore, we include dummy variables for these industries (manufacturing   12 
industry dummy: D1, software development industry dummy: D2, information- 
communication  industry dummy: D3, wholesale-retail industry dummy: D4) in the 
estimation model.   
Here, as the instrumental variables, we consider the ratio of shares held by the 
dummy for the TOP shareholders that shareholding ratio is more than 1/3 and the ratio 
of 1 to the distance of the firms to Tokyo. If there is a chief shareholder, who has strong 
authority, intervention from the outside becomes difficult, and there is little investment 
in these firms  by  VC. Therefore, the dummy for the TOP  shareholders that the 
shareholding ratio is more than 1/3 is used as an instrumental variable.   
Another instrumental variable is the ratio of 1 to the distance of the firms to Tokyo 
(DIS). The farther portfolio firms are located, the more difficult it is for VC to support 
and monitor the managers of portfolio firms by using their specialized experience and 
expertise. Therefore, VC are supposed to prefer firms in their proximity.   
Here, the distance of the firms to Tokyo is a geographical distance between the 
firms that VC hold the share and JR Tokyo station. It is measured in kilo-meters starting 
from the nearest station to the firms to Tokyo station. The information about the   13 
distance was provided by the track information of Yahoo JAPAN. 
We use the ratio of 1 to the distance of the firms to Tokyo (DIS) as an instrumental 
variable, since the location of VC is concentrated in Tokyo.     
 
4.  Description of Data   
 
In 1999, JASDAQ and Tokyo Stock Exchange were established as the new stock 
markets of Japan. There were many IPO venture firms in the new stock markets. The 
IPO firms have developed new products and services based on new technologies and 
ideas,  have discovered new markets  and have  also played a significant role in 
innovation.   
This thesis analyses firms that issued an IPO in the years 1999 (52 firms), 2000 
(19 firms) and 2001 (52 firms). The analysis periods are 1997–1998 and 2000–2001 for 
the firms that performed in 1999, 1998–1999 and 2001–2002 for the firms that 
performed in 2000, and 1999–2000 and 2002–2003 for the firms that performed in 
2001.   14 
We can obtain the data of 123 firms from these firms. Our dataset includes data on 
patent applications, contraptions, R&D expenditures, number of employees and data on 
shareholding by VC. The other factors of ownership structure include shareholding in 
terms of  shareholding ratio by lead share, shareholding ratio by top-10 share, 
shareholding ratio by banks, shareholding ratio by bills, shareholding ratio by firms, 
shareholding ratio by foreign firms and shareholding ratio by directors.   
We use these data on patent applications, contraptions, R&D expenditures, number 
of employees, shareholding by VC and the other factors of ownership structure for the 
years 1997–2003.  Data such as R&D expenditures, number of employees  and 
shareholding by VC, the other factors of  ownership  structure  data  for the pre-  and 
post-IPO periods are collected from the “Annual Corporate Financial  Data” of the 
Development Bank of Japan. Further, the patent application and contraptions data are 
obtained from the Japanese Patent Office’s electronic patent library. The patent data 
include the number of patent applications in the years 1997–2003.   
The information pertaining to VC is obtained from the ‘Nihon Benntya kyapitaru 
Youran’  (Compendium of Venture Capital in Japan). The information on  IPOs  are   15 
obtained from the ‘Kabusiki Tenntou Jyoujyou Hakasyo’ (White Papers of Initial Public 
Offerings) 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
Among the 123 firms, the number of patent applications-backed firms is 59 and 
that of non-patent applications-backed firms is 64 in the pre-IPO period. In the post-IPO 
period, the number of patent applications-backed firms is 58 and that of non-patent 
applications-backed firms is 65. Given the above, it can be stated that the majority of 
sample firms is financed by VC in the pre-IPO period than in the post-IPO  period.    
There are 56 firms backed by VC in the pre-IPO period and 28 firms backed by VC 
in  the post-IPO period. The patent applications of the firms are shown  in Table-2. 
Among those, the number of syndicated VC firms is 27 in the pre-IPO period, and the 
number of non-syndicating VC firms is 7 in the post-IPO period. In addition, it can be 
established that the mean values of the shareholding ratio by all venture capitalists of 
firms in the pre-IPO period are significantly higher than those of firms in the post-IPO 
period.   
Here, bank-VC is 9 firms, bill-VC is 9 firms, firm-VC is 5 firms, independence-VC 
is 12 firms and foreign-VC is 21 firms in the pre-IPO period. Bank-VC is 7 firms,   16 
bill-VC is 3 firms, firm-VC is 3 firms, independence-VC is 5 firms and foreign-VC is 
10 firms in the post-IPO period. The firms are shown in Table-3. 
The change in the other ownership structure, including the shareholding ratio by 
banks, the shareholding ratio by bills, the shareholding ratio by firms, the shareholding 
ratio by foreign firms and the shareholding ratio by directors are shown in Table-4. In 
addition, it can be established that the mean values of the shareholding ratio by bills, 
firms and directors of firms in the pre-IPO period are higher than those of firms in the 
post-IPO period. The mean values of the shareholding ratio by banks in the post-IPO 
period are higher than that in the pre-IPO period. 
In the pre-IPO period, the mean value of natural logarithm of (numbers of patent 
applications) of the firms is 0.279, but the median is 0. In the post-IPO period, the mean 
is 0.205 and the median is 0. The descriptive statistics presented in Table-5 suggest that 
the distribution of the dependent variable is skewed to the left in the pre- and post-IPO 
periods.   
The  intensity  of R&D activities is higher in the  software  development, 
manufacturing  and  information-communication  industries. There are 71  firms that   17 
belong to the  manufacturing, software development and information-communication 
industries.   
   A correlation matrix is presented in Table-6. 
 
5.  Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
We employ the IVTOBIT Model (the Tobit Model with endogenous regressors 
method)  in  the empirical analysis. The results of the estimation are presented in 
Tables-7 and -8.  The estimations of the pre-IPO period and post-IPO period are 
compared in those Tables.  Further, the industry dummy variables,  manufacturing, 
software development, information-communication and wholesale-retail industries are 
included in all the models, which are not shown in the tables. 
The variables of VC shareholding (VCSH  and  SVCSH) are included 
interchangeably in the estimation. With regard to the estimated value of the variables 
pertaining to ownership structure, the variables concerning VC (VCSH, SVCSH, 
BA_VC, COM_VC, IND_VC and FOR_VC) display positively significant coefficients   18 
in the pre-IPO period. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported by the results. These results 
suggest that VC have a positively significant effect on the patent applications of firms in 
the pre-IPO period.     
The values of the coefficients of the variables concerning VC (VCSH, SVCSH, 
BA_VC, BI_VC, COM_VC, IND_VC and FOR_VC) are not positive and significant in 
the post-IPO period. Therefore, it can be stated that the effect of VC become feeble in 
the post-IPO period. Thus, hypothesis 2 is supported.     
  In contrast, in the pre- and post-IPO periods, the coefficients of the shareholding 
ratio by lead share, shareholding ratio by top-10 share, shareholding ratio by banks, 
shareholding ratio by bills, shareholding ratio by firms, shareholding ratio by foreign 
firms and shareholding ratio by directors do not show significant values. This suggests 
that the shareholding by the other shareholders do not have positive effects on patent 
applications.   
The  values of the RDE variable (natural logarithm of R&D expenditures) are 
positive and significant in the models. Therefore, we conclude that the number of 
patents increases with an increase in R&D expenditures in the pre- and post-IPO periods.   19 
Further, the coefficients of SIZE do show significant values in the pre-IPO periods.   
For the estimation, it can be stated  that the shareholding by VC  is positively 
correlated with their patent applications of the firms in the pre-IPO period. However, 
this effect disappears in the post-IPO period. Further, it is proved that VC increases their 
patent applications in the pro-IPO period.   
 
6.  Conclusion   
 
This paper focused on the role of VC in patent applications and analyzed the 
relationship between the characteristics of the ownership structure and patent 
applications. It was observed that shareholding by VC was positively correlated with 
patent applications in the pre-IPO period. In addition, it can be stated that the effect of 
VC become feeble in the post-IPO period.   
On the basis of the analysis, it was found that VC played a positive role in the 
patent application of Japanese firms in order to increase a firm’s market valuations in 
the pre-IPO period.     20 
In this paper, we have generalized the aforementioned conclusion and its 
significance; however, there are still a few limitations in this analysis. First, the sample 
is small—the sample used for the analysis comprised of only 123 firms that had issued 
an IPO in 1999, 2000 and 2001—and may be biased. Since the data for the shareholding 
ratio and R&D expenditure are not available for all firms that issued an IPO, only those 
firms that published such data were chosen for the analysis.   
Second, the mean of the shareholding ratio of venture capitalists is 2.036% in the 
pre-IPO period and 0.504% in the post-IPO period. VC maintain stocks in the post-IPO 
period,  and  this may have a long term effect. As the long-term effects cannot be 
thoroughly investigated due to the limitations of the data in our analysis, it will be 
considered as a future research endeavour. Here, it can be stated that the effect of VC 
become feeble in the post-IPO period.   
Nevertheless, there have been few empirical studies concerning the effect of VC 
on patent applications of Japanese firms. Thus, by studying the role of VC in the patent 
applications of firms, our thesis can be regarded as the first step toward conducting 
productive research in this field.  21 
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     Table-1：　Definitions of Variables
                 Dependent variables
 Natural logarithm of (numberｓ of  patent applications +1) (PAT)
 Natural logarithm of (numberｓ of  patent applications + contraptions+1) (PAT1)
                   Explanatory variables 
 Shareholding ratio by all venture capitalists (VCSH)
 Shareholding ratio by  syndicating venture capitalists (SVCSH)
 Bank-venture capitalist dummy  (BA_VC)
 Bill-venture capitalist dummy  (BI_VC)
 Firm-venture capitalist dummy (COM_VC)
 Independence-venture capitalist dummy  (IND_VC)
 Ownership Structure/  Foreign-venture capitalist dummy (FOR_VC)
   Governance Factors  Shareholding ratio by  lead share  (TOP_SH)
 Shareholding ratio by  top-10 share (TOP10_SH)
 Shareholding ratio by  banks (BASH)
 Shareholding ratio by  bills (BISH)
 Shareholding ratio by  firms (COMSH)
 Shareholding ratio by  foreign firms (FOCOMSH)
 Shareholding ratio by  directors (DIRSH)
 Natural logarithm of R&D expenditures (RDE)
 Firm-level Factors  Employee number (SIZE)
 Manufacturing industry dummy (D1)
 Software industry dummy (D2)
 Industry Factors  Information-communication industry dummy (D3)
 Wholesale-Retail industry dummy (D4)
 Other industry dummy (D5)
 Instrumental Variables  Dummy for the TOP shareholders that shareholding ratio is more than 1/3(TOPD)
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Table‐2: VC and Patent Applications 
            Pre-IPO             Post-IPO
VC NO-VC VC NO-VC
Number of Firms 56 67 28 95
PAT 39 19 20 37








Table‐3: Attribution of VC
Number of Firms Bank-VC B ill-V C Fi r m-V C I ndependence-VC Forei gn-VC
Pre-IPO 9 9 5 12 21
Post-IPO 7 3 3 5 10
 
 






               ( Shareholding Ratio)
Mean（％） Bill Firm Foreign Directors VC Bank
Pre-IPO 0.64 27.86 5.53 24.79 2.03 3.85
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Table-5-1：  Descriptive Statistics
　Nｕｍｂｅｒ of observations (246: pro-IPO)
Variables  Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
PAT 0.279 0.366 0 1.32
PAT1 0.282 0.37 0 1.36
RDE 2.62 2.47 0 6.02
VCSH 0.0203 0.0377 0 0.273
SVCSH 0.0122 0.029 0 0.168
BA_VC 0.0732 0.261 0 1
BI_VC 0.0691 0.254 0 1
COM_VC 0.049 0.216 0 1
IND_VC 0.0976 0.297 0 1
FOR_VC 0.167 0.373 0 1
BASH 0.0385 0.0448 0 0.258
BISH 0.0064 0.0166 0 0.126
COMSH 0.279 0.231 0.0022 0.849
FORCOMSH 0.0553 0.128 0 0.892
DIRSH 0.248 0.212 0 0.875
TOP_SH 0.338 0.198 0.0475 0.888
TOP10_SH 0.677 0.144 0.326 0.938
SIZE 3.42 4.42 0.05 23.76
D1 0.301 0.459 0 1
D2 0.171 0.377 0 1
D3 0.106 0.308 0 1
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 Table-5-2：  Descriptive Statistics
　　　　Nｕｍｂｅｒ of observations (246: post-IPO)
Variables  Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
PAT 0.205 0.321 0 1.36
PAT1 0.209 0.324 0 1.39
RDE 2.8 2.47 0 6.14
VCSH 0.00505 0.0133 0 0.086
SVCSH 0.00177 0.00929 0 0.086
BA_VC 0.053 0.224 0 1
BI_VC 0.024 0.155 0 1
COM_VC 0.0203 0.141 0 1
IND_VC 0.0407 0.198 0 1
FOR_VC 0.069 0.254 0 1
BASH 0.0443 0.0499 0 0.258
BISH 0.00556 0.00827 0 0.06
COMSH 0.239 0.221 0.13 0.904
FORCOMSH 0.063 0.125 0 0.887
DIRSH 0.223 0.195 0 0.829
TOP_SH 0.302 0.191 0.0475 0.877
TOP10_SH 0.618 0.147 0.298 0.939
SIZE 3.66 4.53 0.03 29.11
D1 0.301 0.459 0 1
D2 0.171 0.377 0 1
D3 0.106 0.308 0 1
D4 0.252 0.435 0 1 
  27 
Table-6-1: Correlation  Matrix
 Number of observations (246: pre-IPO)
Variables  PAT PAT1 RDE VCSH SVCSH BA_VC BI_VC COM_VC IND_VC FOR_VC BASH BISH COMSH FORCOMSH DIRSH TOP_SHTOP10_SH SIZE
PAT 1
PAT1 0.999 1
RDE 0.416 0.42 1
VCSH 0.209 0.207 0.194 1
SVCSH 0.109 0.104 0.0748 0.682 1
BA_VC 0.239 0.236 0.149 0.162 0.197 1
BI_VC -0.0371 -0.039 0.032 0.185 0.19 -0.0766 1
COM_VC 0.0475 0.0447 -0.0247 0.362 0.532 -0.0636 -0.062 1
IND_VC 0.149 0.151 0.0847 0.413 0.164 -0.0924 0.0184 -0.0745 1
FOR_VC 0.269 0.264 0.252 0.0822 0.0256 -0.126 -0.122 -0.101 -0.147 1
BASH -0.0878 -0.091 -0.103 -0.121 -0.228 -0.101 -0.0858 -0.167 0.119 -0.103 1
BISH -0.0924 -0.0947 -0.048 -0.0215 -0.0643 -0.0375 0.225 0.0004 -0.0597 -0.0786 -0.0068 1
COMSH -0.0513 -0.0534 -0.222 0.0497 0.0519 0.049 -0.136 -0.0494 0.0163 0.0634 -0.0187 -0.184 1
FORCOMSH -0.0679 -0.0698 -0.0253 -0.0526 -0.0644 0.0089 -0.0844 -0.0429 0.0463 0.0887 -0.0583 -0.0387 -0.172 1
DIRSH 0.0669 0.072 0.072 0.056 0.118 -0.0104 0.185 0.109 -0.0469 0.0302 -0.195 -0.0367 -0.516 -0.203 1
TOP_SH -0.0897 -0.091 -0.139 -0.0937 -0.0535 -0.0913 -0.0398 -0.0046 -0.0514 0.26 -0.214 -0.0717 0.226 0.286 0.103 1
TOP10_SH -0.0234 -0.016 -0.104 0.0205 -0.032 -0.0087 -0.127 0.0216 0.0385 0.155 -0.252 -0.18 0.329 0.14 0.13 0.736 1
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Table-6-2: Correlation  Matrix
                  Number of observations (246: post-IPO)
Variables  PAT PAT1 RDE VCSH SVCSH BA_VC BI_VC COM_VC IND_VC FOR_VC BASH BISH COMSH FORCOMSH DIRSH TOP_SH TOP10_SH SIZE
PAT 1
PAT1 0.996 1
RDE 0.455 0.452 1
VCSH 0.0678 0.0625 0.208 1
SVCSH 0.0182 0.0157 0.0599 0.653 1
BA_VC 0.116 0.112 0.132 0.538 0.609 1
BI_VC -0.0126 -0.0143 0.0667 0.0828 -0.0302 -0.0373 1
COM_VC 0.0247 0.0227 0.135 0.134 0.141 -0.034 -0.0228 1
IND_VC -0.0239 -0.0261 0.0346 0.363 -0.0393 -0.0486 -0.0325 -0.0296 1
FOR_VC 0.0535 0.0497 0.0872 0.308 0.03 -0.0644 -0.0431 -0.0392 -0.0561 1
BASH 0.027 0.0249 0.0213 -0.0692 -0.0201 -0.0747 -130 -0.046 0.109 -0.166 1
BISH 0.0237 0.0222 0.049 -0.0804 -0.0606 -0.0912 0.106 0.0252 -0.0897 0.062 -0.0414 1
COMSH -0.131 -0.123 -0.199 0.0216 -0.0116 0.0485 -0.112 -0.086 0.078 0.049 -0.0732 -0.151 1
FORCOMSH -0.0487 -0.0525 -0.0754 -0.0632 -0.0516 -0.0545 -0.0221 -0.0245 -0.056 0.0191 -0.0119 0.0273 -0.194 1
DIRSH 0.0671 0.061 0.0882 0.0539 0.107 0.0388 0.0781 0.146 -0.0508 0.0158 -0.134 -0.0243 -0.508 -0.131 1
TOP_SH -0.128 -0.118 -0.169 -0.0483 0.0304 -0.061 0.0029 0.073 -0.093 0.0647 -0.239 -0.121 0.319 0.25 0.176 1
TOP10_SH -0.115 -0.104 -0.159 0.0475 0.0553 0.027 -0.105 0.0012 0.123 0.0165 -0.175 -0.247 0.413 0.169 0.169 0.757 1
SIZE 0.0866 0.0911 0.0422 -0.0833 -0.0656 -0.097 -0.0893 -0.0777 -0.033 -0.0503 0.348 0.0269 0.0416 0.136 -0.121 -0.0326 -0.0382 1
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                                     Table‐7： Estimation Results
                                    Method of Estimation: IVTOBIT (Tobit Model with Endogenous Regressors) 
                                   Dependent variable
                        Natural logarithm of numberｓ of  patent applications (PAT)
PRE-IPO POST-IPO
Explanatory variables  ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
VCSH 0.0911 0.398
(1.81)c (0.74)
SVCSH 0.129 0.166 0.148 0.0268 -0.098 0.022











BASH -0.0032 0.0072 0.0117 0.01 -0.00064 0.0017 0.000075 0.00012 -0.00002 0.0029
(-0.29) (0.59) (0.81) (0.73) (-0.07) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (-0.001) (0.28)
BISH -0.0231 -0.0089 -0.0079 -0.0063 -0.0101 0.0948 0.0426 0.0342 0.0351 0.0454
(-0.72) (-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.19) (-0.36) (0.97) (0.72) (0.58) (0.61) (0.90)
COMSH -0.0012 -0.00029 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.00559 -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.00082 -0.0032
(-0.35) (-0.09) (-0.52) (-0.43) (-0.62) (-1.01) (-0.69) (-0.39) (-0.21) (-1.10)
FORCOMSH -0.001 0.0018 0.00059 0.00099 -0.0058 0.00015 -0.00018 0.00028 0.00137 -0.00013
(-0.23) (0.40) (0.12) (0.21) (-1.38) (0.03) (-0.04) (0.06) (0.28) (-0.03)
DIRSH 0.00044 0.00053 -0.0012 -0.00079 0.00016 -0.0028 -0.00006 0.0012 0.0014 -0.0001





RDE 0.0783 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.063 0.0922 0.128 0.131 0.126 0.121
(3.07)a (3.54)a (3.39)a (3.47)a (2.84)a (1.62) (4.27)a (4.39)a (4.30)a (4.77)a
SIZE 0.00025 0.00027 0.00032 0.0003 0.00022 0.00026 0.00016 0.00014 0.00015 0.00017
(1.94)c (2.15)b (2.12)b (2.11)b (2.26)b (1.34) (1.17) (1.02) (1.20) (1.67)c
Constant -0.452 -0.622 -0.708 -0.806 -0.427 -0.555 -0.639 -0.657 -0.504 -0.643
(-1.94)c (-2.46)b (-2.41)b (-1.94)c (-2.05)b (-1.95)c (-2.77)a (-2.80)a (-1.72)c (-3.02)a
Log likelihood -821 -745 -745 -744 -158 -554 -472 -471 -472 -145
Number of observations 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246
 1) The level of significance: a 1%, b 5%, c 10%.
 2)  T-statistics in parentheses.
 3)   Industry dummies are included in the estimation, but not shown in the table.
 4)  TOBIT Model is used in the ⑤.   
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                                     Table-8： Estimation Results
                                    Method of Estimation: IVTOBIT (Tobit Model with Endogenous Regressors) 
                                   Dependent variable
                        Natural logarithm of numberｓ of  (patent applications + contraption)（PAT1)
PRE-IPO POST-IPO
Explanatory variables  ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
VCSH 0.091 0.373
(1.79)c (0.71)
SVCSH 0.129 0.165 0.15 0.038 -0.142 0.0481











BASH -0.0036 0.0068 0.011 0.0099 -0.00116 0.00071 -0.00089 -0.0004 -0.00103 0.0018
(-0.33) (0.55) (0.76) (0.71) (-0.12) (0.06) (-0.09) (-0.04) (-0.10) (0.18)
BISH -0.0241 -0.01 -0.0089 -0.007 -0.0107 0.0884 0.0401 0.0291 0.0361 0.0423
(-0.75) (-0.31) (-0.26) (-0.21) (-0.38) (0.92) (0.68) (0.48) (0.62) (0.83)
COMSH -0.0012 -0.00032 -0.0021 -0.00196 -0.0016 -0.0054 -0.0026 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0032
(-0.36) (-0.10) (-0.50) (-0.47) (-0.61) (-1.00) (-0.71) (-0.42) (-0.40) (-1.09)
FORCOMSH -0.001 0.0018 0.00062 0.00087 -0.0058 -0.00019-0.00049-0.00036 0.00051 -0.00046
(-0.23) (0.39) (0.12) (0.18) (-1.37) (-0.04) (-0.11) (-0.07) (0.10) (-0.10)
DIRSH 0.0005 0.00061 -0.001 -0.00084 0.0003 -0.0028 -0.00036 0.001 0.00049 -0.0003





RDE 0.0809 0.0936 0.0949 0.0944 0.0665 0.0948 0.128 0.133 0.126 0.122
(3.15)a (3.61)a (3.46)a (3.53)a (2.93)a (1.69)c (4.27)a (4.36)a (4.26)a (4.77)a
SIZE 0.0003 0.00028 0.00032 0.0003 0.00022 0.00026 0.00016 0.00013 0.00017 0.00018
(1.94)c (2.15)b (2.11)b (2.12)b (2.24)b (1.36) (1.23) (0.97) (1.27) (1.70)c
Constant -0.454 -0.624 -0.705 -0.827 -0.432 -0.552 -0.629 -0.659 -0.539 -0.635
(-1.93)c (-2.45)b (-2.38)b (-1.97)b (-2.04)b (-1.98)b (-2.73)a (-2.77)a (-1.82)c (-2.98)a
Log likelihood -822 -747 -746 -746 -159 -555 -473 -472 -473 -146
Number of observations 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246
 1) The level of significance: a 1%, b 5%, c 10%.
 2)  T-statistics in parentheses.
 3)   Industry dummies are included in the estimation, but not shown in the table.
 4)  TOBIT Model is used in the ⑤.  